Berlin, Germany (Weltexpress). Given the radical shift in US foreign policy, can Europe continue the proxy war against Russia without the US? Do Trump’s efforts to fundamentally improve relations with Russia require a downgrading of relations with Europe? And what are Russia’s goals?
Professor John Mearsheimer, a prominent political scientist and offensive realist, provided a sober analysis of these dynamics on March 8 in a conversation with the Norwegian professor Glenn Diesen and the British geo-strategist Alexander Mercuris, which was distributed on YouTube . He emphasizes the limits of European power, the limitations of Trump’s options for action and Russia’s three non-negotiable positions.
Mearsheimer argues that Europe is not in a position to continue the proxy war against Russia on its own if the US withdraws its military and financial support. He notes that even the combined efforts of the United States, Europe and Ukraine could not stop Russian advances, making it unlikely that Europe alone could compensate for the loss of American support.
“If we couldn’t stop the Russian steamroller with the Americans, Europeans and Ukrainians working together,” he notes, “it’s hard to see how you can take the Americans out of the equation and the Europeans pick up the slack,” Mearsheimer says.
He points to the weakened state of the European armed forces, particularly the British and French, which have neither the resources nor the coordination to help Ukraine effectively. Even with increased defense spending, Mearsheimer says it would take years for Europe to provide tangible support to the battlefield, making any independent attempt futile in the short term.
This assessment ties in with Europe’s fragmented nature, which Mearsheimer sees as a decisive obstacle to joint action. He rejects the idea of Europe as a coherent entity and instead describes it as “a collection of countries” with different interests. Without the US, which historically solved collective action problems through its dominant power, European efforts fall apart. He points to the recent meetings in Paris and the UK, which were mainly driven by France and the UK along with Ukraine – the so-called “three musketeers” – while nations such as Poland, Germany and Italy are reluctant to commit troops or resources. This disunity, he predicts, will grow over time and further weaken Europe’s position.
With regard to Trump’s pursuit of peace with Russia, Mearsheimer wonders whether this requires a downgrading of US-European relations. He suggests that Trump’s disdain for Europe, already evident in his first term and reinforced by his current policy goals, could lead to a reduced US military engagement on the continent.
According to Mearsheimer, Trump’s goal is to “significantly reduce, if not eliminate, American military involvement in Europe” while seeking better relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the analyst suggests a strategic alternative: Trump could persuade Europe to support his peace initiative by offering to maintain NATO and a limited US presence – in exchange for European cooperation in pressuring Ukraine to negotiate.
This approach, he argues, corresponds to both strategic and moral imperatives – to put an end to the war in order to save Ukrainian lives and prevent further territorial losses. Although he doubts that Europe’s current emotional attachment to the conflict allows for an immediate adoption of this rationality.
On Russia’s goals, Mearsheimer is unequivocal: Moscow seeks to maximize its gains as long as the balance of power is in its favor. He sees Russia’s rejection of a ceasefire as logical, as a pause would allow Europe to rearm Ukraine and undermine Russia’s advantage on the battlefield. “The Russians have made it unmistakably clear that they will not accept a ceasefire,” he emphasizes, highlighting their desire to dictate the terms. With Trump pushing for a quick solution, Russia has leverage.
In Mearsheimer’s opinion, the Russians view the US as a “wild and crazy country” that will be prone to policy changes again after Trump’s term in office. Mearsheimer predicts that Russia will negotiate hard to secure Ukrainian territory and ensure that Kiev never joins NATO. And that Moscow will seize this “window of opportunity” before a potentially less conciliatory US administration comes to power.
Mearsheimer also looks at the wider implications for NATO and the West. Within Trump’s four years, NATO will only be an “empty shell”, with reduced US troops and doubts about the reliability of Article 5. But he does not expect NATO to disintegrate completely during this time. He points out that Russia might paradoxically prefer a US presence in Europe in order to stabilize the continent and prevent destabilizing steps such as German nuclear armament. However, he warns that the emotionalism and failure of Western elites to adapt to facts – exemplified by their refusal to take Russia’s interests into account – threatens further fragmentation. This will undermine their domestic credibility and further fuel populist discontent in European countries.
In summary, Mearsheimer paints a picture of a Europe that is ill-equipped to continue the war in Ukraine on its own. An America under Trump that prioritizes good relations with Russia over its previous ties to Europe. And a Russia that is determined to use Western divisions to achieve its goals.
All of this would further drive the fragmentation of Europe towards irrelevance, unless a pragmatic deal is struck between Russia and the United States as part of a constructive involvement of the Europeans. But Mearsheimer believes this is unlikely. This is because the leading political elites in Europe are so blinded by their ideologized self-righteousness that they are incapable of making real political decisions. This means that unless these elites are replaced, Europe will continue on its course of self-destruction.
