Home Politics Superpower on the Retreat – Iran Shows US Military Power Its Limits

Superpower on the Retreat – Iran Shows US Military Power Its Limits

A United States aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf. Source: Pixabay, Photo: David Mark

Berlin, Germany (Weltexpress). For decades, US aircraft carriers were regarded as the undisputed symbols of global power. Yet in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Iran, dangerous weaknesses are being exposed. The crisis facing the US Navy raises a fundamental question: Is Washington’s military superiority a thing of the past?

Aircraft carriers at their limit – the exhausted projection of power

US aircraft carriers were meant to dominate the world’s oceans. Yet off the coast of Iran, it has become clear just how ill-prepared the military structures of the last century are for the challenges of modern warfare: overstretched operations, vulnerable supply lines and modern Iranian weapon systems. The crisis extends far beyond the Persian Gulf.

US military power faces a strategic dilemma that seemed unthinkable just a few decades ago: whilst its most powerful warships can still deploy immense firepower, their deployment is increasingly constrained by a lack of secure bases, overstretched supply lines and modern enemy weapon systems.

The current concentration of US aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea illustrates this development. The USS George H. W. Bush has already been on deployment for 225 days. The USS George Washington, whose redeployment to Japan began in April 2024, left Yokosuka again on 23 May 2026 and has now been at sea for 172 days. The USS Theodore Roosevelt is due to relieve her.

This will result in a temporary concentration of potentially three US aircraft carriers in the wider Gulf region. Yet this apparent demonstration of military strength masks a structural weakness: deployment periods cannot be extended indefinitely; crews need rest, aircraft require maintenance, and the ships need fuel, spare parts and ammunition.

By the end of 2026, according to the forecast by US military analyst Will Schryver, the Roosevelt could be the only US aircraft carrier remaining in the region.

A global empire without safe havens

Even more serious is the loss of strategic fallback and supply areas. The US Navy still maintains a global network of bases. However, their mere existence by no means guarantees that they can be used safely in the event of war.

The central argument is this: between the US East Coast and Japan, there is practically no longer any fully secure supply base for US aircraft carrier strike groups in the event of a major war against a serious adversary.

Throughout the Middle East, US facilities lie within the range of Iranian missiles and drones. In the western Pacific, Chinese long-range weapons could threaten US bases and supply facilities. Even traditional fallback areas such as Israel or Cyprus are no longer safe havens. Furthermore, if US ships wish to travel from the Arabian Sea to Europe or the US, they can no longer pass through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal due to the Houthis, but must instead take the long and stormy route around the Horn of Africa. This is the prospect facing the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its escort vessels on their return journey to Norfolk (Virginia). It illustrates the enormous additional distances involved, the logistical problems and the strain on crew and equipment.

This undermines the very foundations of US power projection. Aircraft carriers are not self-sufficient floating fortresses. Without supply ships, repair facilities, sheltered harbours and functioning supply chains, even the most expensive weapon systems increasingly lose their military value.

The range dilemma off the coast of Iran

This dilemma becomes particularly clear in the event of a potential attack on Iran. In the era of US ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’, US aircraft carriers could generally operate safely 100 nautical miles (around 185 kilometres) off the enemy’s coast. The range of the US naval air force into enemy territory was correspondingly limited. The most widely used US fighter-bomber, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has a range of less than 400 nautical miles (approx. 740 kilometres) when heavily armed and fully loaded with ammunition, without additional external fuel tanks.

However, due to Iran’s long-range and highly accurate missiles, US aircraft carriers operate in the Arabian Sea, more than 500 nautical miles (926 kilometres) from the Iranian coast. To attack targets deep within Iranian territory, the aircraft carriers would either have to move into the danger zone closer to the Iranian coast, or their fighter aircraft would have to be refuelled during the mission using slower – and therefore more vulnerable – refuelling aircraft. Among the more than 80 US fighter aircraft that Iran has already destroyed are a number of refuelling aircraft.

Both options entail considerable risks. Moving closer would expose the carriers to a greater threat from Iranian anti-ship missiles, drones and other means of attack. Air-to-air refuelling, in turn, creates additional vulnerable targets: large refuelling aircraft are more difficult to protect than fighter aircraft. If they are threatened or forced to retreat, the operational range of the US Air Force is reduced. It is therefore to be expected that, should the US and Israeli attacks against Iran resume – as threatened by Donald Trump before the end of the year – the first step will be to attempt to neutralise Iranian air defence systems and missile sites, although this could also result in significant losses on their own side.

Iran has learnt from past US attacks

The claims, repeated like a mantra by Trump and his Minister of War, Pete Hegseth, that Iran’s military capabilities have already been decisively destroyed bear no relation to reality. They are crude slogans of defiance from people who cannot admit their own defeat.

The latest underground missile facility in the west of the country, recently unveiled by Iran, is cited as evidence of the resilience of the Iranian defence industry. Added to this are new electro-optical air defence systems such as the Arash-e Kamangir, which have also been successfully deployed against US MQ-9 drones costing nearly 30 million dollars.

The strategic significance, however, lies less in individual weapon systems than in their combination: mobile missile launchers, underground facilities, drones and a dispersed air defence network, coupled with inhospitable terrain featuring mountains, caves and deep gorges, make it virtually impossible to destroy Iran’s arsenal through air strikes alone.

A 20th-century military in a 21st-century war

What is emerging for Iran applies on an even larger scale to potential US conflicts with Russia or China.

The structure of the US armed forces continues to rely heavily on large, costly platforms: aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, destroyers and centralised supply facilities. Their adversaries, by contrast, are increasingly relying on long-range precision weapons, comparatively low-cost drones, electronic warfare and the targeting of logistical hubs.

This by no means implies that US aircraft carriers have become militarily worthless. Against poorly armed and weak nations of the Global South, they can still project or deploy their power with impunity. However, the conflict with Iran has shown that they no longer fulfil their previous role as virtually untouchable instruments of global power projection.

The crucial question is therefore no longer how much firepower Washington can mobilise, but how long it can sustain it whilst under enemy fire.

Trump’s dangerous temptation

This presents President Trump with a political dilemma. Outwardly, he continues to claim that Iran has been defeated and could be completely destroyed at any time. In reality, however, even the loss of just a few fighter aircraft or damage to a US warship could trigger significant domestic political repercussions. Trump might therefore be tempted, rather than waging a costly, all-out air war, to launch a brief, regionally limited, demonstrative attack using Tomahawk cruise missiles and JASSM guided missiles, to declare victory immediately afterwards, and then, without any negotiations with Tehran, to pack up and withdraw US forces from the entire region.

However, even limited attacks on Iran carry risks of escalation. Tehran could strike Israeli infrastructure or the energy facilities of the Gulf states. Rising oil prices would then also hit the US economy.

Conclusion

The US military can continue to unleash enormous destructive power for a short time. But destructive power alone guarantees neither military success nor political control. When even aircraft carrier strike groups are increasingly forced to tailor their operations to the vulnerability of their supply lines, the strategic balance of power shifts.

The decline of US hegemony is thus not necessarily evident in a lost naval battle. It unfolds in a far less spectacular manner: through extended deployment times, a lack of safe harbours, compromised supply routes and a growing inability to translate even regional military superiority into lasting political power.

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