Berlin, Germany (Weltexpress). China is expanding its scientific cooperation with Iran to include the strategic field of rare earths, including processing technologies. This marks another milestone in the scientific and technical relations between the two countries.
China and Iran are extending their cooperation into an area that goes far beyond traditional raw materials policy: rare earths. As reported by the South China Morning Post (SCMP) on 12 August, the state-run science funding organisations of both countries have launched a joint workshop programme that explicitly covers the ‘exploration and processing of rare earth elements’. This gives the Sino-Iranian partnership a new strategic dimension – and at a time when Iran is under massive economic and military pressure from the United States.
On the Chinese side, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) is leading the initiative. It is funding joint workshops with 30,000 yuan each; the Iranian Science Foundation is covering travel costs, amongst other things. What is remarkable is not so much the amount of funding as its purpose: China increasingly regards modern methods for processing rare earths as sensitive technology. The 17 elements are indispensable for high-performance magnets, electronics, radar systems, aircraft and numerous modern weapon systems. The People’s Republic not only possesses the largest reserves but, above all, the world’s dominant refining and processing capacity.
Iran’s actual deposits, by contrast, have not yet been sufficiently explored. However, its geological structure, which includes large iron and phosphate deposits, is considered potentially favourable for rare earths. Should this potential be confirmed, Iran could bring a further strategic raw material into its partnership with Beijing, alongside oil and gas. This is precisely why the new research collaboration is politically sensitive: China appears to be sharing, at the very least, scientific expertise in a field where Beijing is increasingly shielding its technological processes from Western nations.
The agreement is not an isolated project. The People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran have maintained a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ since 2016. In 2021, both states signed a long-term cooperation plan, the implementation of which officially began in early 2022.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports bilateral trade in goods of US$9.96 billion for 2025 – a figure that does not fully reflect the substantial volumes of Iranian oil, which are often traded via indirect trade structures due to US sanctions.
When it comes to oil, China has long been Iran’s key buyer. According to Reuters, the People’s Republic imported an average of around 1.38 million barrels of Iranian crude oil per day in 2025. Much of the trade is channelled through smaller independent Chinese refineries and is partly settled in yuan via intermediaries to mitigate the impact of US financial sanctions. As recently as 20 August, Reuters reported that, despite fresh threats from Washington, China remains by far Iran’s most important oil customer.
However, this partnership should not be confused with an unrestricted alliance. China’s economic involvement in Iran remains comparatively cautious when measured against political announcements. Reuters put Chinese investment since 2007 at less than five billion US dollars – significantly less than Beijing’s involvement in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. According to the news agency, sanctions, political risks and Iran’s economic instability have delayed numerous major projects.
Nevertheless, Chinese firms remain involved in Iranian infrastructure projects. In March, Reuters documented projects currently underway or out to tender in sectors such as electricity grids, steel production, hydropower, freight transport and logistics. At the same time, Iran remains a key hub for China’s Belt and Road strategy, particularly for land links between East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
Cooperation is also broadening in the scientific and technological spheres. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries are working together on the basis of existing agreements on science and technology; universities maintain institutional links, whilst Tehran and Beijing are now specifically expanding their cooperation in strategically relevant fields of research.
The rare-earth programme should therefore be seen primarily as an indication that this cooperation is increasingly shifting from academic exchange towards key technologies of industrial relevance.
The military dimension is even more sensitive. As early as March 2025, China, Iran and Russia conducted the ‘Security Belt 2025’ exercise in the Gulf of Oman. Near the Iranian port of Chabahar, ships from the three navies practised, amongst other things, attacks on maritime targets as well as search and rescue operations. At the time, the Chinese Ministry of Defence explicitly stated that the aim was to deepen “military trust and pragmatic cooperation”.
In July 2026, Reuters also reported, citing three sources familiar with the matter, that Iran had placed an order for up to 400 portable air defence systems of the QW-12 and FN-16 types, manufactured in the People’s Republic of China. The deal is said to be worth around 60 to 70 million dollars. However, China and Pakistan denied any involvement, which is why the report should not be treated as having been independently confirmed. According to Reuters, Tehran was also discussing further Chinese systems, including anti-ship missiles.
Politically, the trend is clear: Beijing continues to treat Iran as a strategic partner. As recently as July, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi and reaffirmed the importance of bilateral relations.
For Iran, the People’s Republic is thus simultaneously a market, a technology partner, a source of diplomatic reassurance and a potential source of military capabilities. For Beijing, in turn, Iran offers energy, geographical access to West Asia and, potentially in the future, strategic minerals. The cooperation remains asymmetrical – Tehran needs Beijing far more than the reverse. Yet the new collaboration on rare earths in particular shows that China is prepared to deepen this relationship in areas that extend directly into the global technology and security competition.
