Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany (Weltexpress). Those who refuse to accept the West’s loss of global hegemony are in the process of igniting a conflict that, in the end, no one will be able to control, according to the world-renowned economist and geostrategist Professor Sachs.
In a series of interviews and discussions on YouTube, Professor Sachs attributes the cause of the current crisis to the historical loss of power by the collective West. However, Sachs does not see the rise of China or Russia as the threat of a new world war, but rather the West’s reaction to it.
The United States and its closest allies – the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan and Australia – have, over the course of some two centuries, significantly shaped and exploited the world. This era is now coming to an end. Not because the West is disappearing or has become economically insignificant, but because it has lost its former ability to shape the international order solely in its own favour.
Sachs therefore speaks of a ‘double crisis’: a crisis for the US and a crisis for the West. What is particularly problematic, he argues, is that American foreign policy is still shaped by the notion that the United States must defend its global supremacy – and that it is still capable of doing so. For the view that had increasingly taken hold amongst Washington’s power elites following the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 – namely that, as the sole superpower, America could do as it pleased – still prevails in the US. However, that world no longer exists, and the real balance of power – economically, militarily and politically – has changed fundamentally.
For Sachs, this new multipolarity is not in itself a misfortune. On the contrary: he regards China’s return to the ranks of major world powers and Russia’s regaining of strength following the collapse of the Soviet Union as fundamentally positive, as this could also pave the way for greater prosperity and cooperation.
The fact is that a world in which several major powers carry economic and political weight need not automatically be more dangerous than the global hegemony of an unchecked Washington regime made up of war profiteers.
When cooperation for mutual benefit is no longer an option for Western elites
According to Sachs, it is particularly worrying that influential sections of the American strategic establishment increasingly view the world as a zero-sum game. This means that one side can only gain at the expense of the other. Consequently, America must lose if China rises. If Russia grows stronger, then the West grows weaker. Sachs counters this ‘logic’ – widespread amongst neo-colonial exploiters – with a completely different concept. Economic cooperation is fundamentally a ‘positive-sum game’: trade, technological cooperation and economic interdependence could benefit all parties involved. Yet it is precisely this way of thinking that has been lost on Western elites in politics and the media, and on the heads of transcontinental financial conglomerates.
As an example, Sachs points to the analyses of various possible future world orders that are much discussed within the neoliberal establishment. In these, a multipolar world is essentially described as dangerous. Spheres of influence are also seen as problematic. Cooperation between the major powers is supposedly regarded as unrealistic. A stronger Chinese position is portrayed as a threat. Ultimately, what remains is the idea that Western states must unite to counter China.
For Sachs, it is precisely this logic that is the dangerous aspect: if cooperation is fundamentally regarded as naïve and the only remaining strategy consists of allying against a supposedly identified adversary, then peaceful cooperation no longer stands a chance.
A parallel with the period immediately preceding the First World War
Europe did not plunge into war in 1914 because its societies were on the brink of economic collapse. On the contrary: even shortly before the First World War, Europe had experienced an extraordinary period of scientific, technical and economic progress. Nevertheless, a situation arose in which the major European powers divided into two increasingly entrenched blocs. Alliances, rearmament, mutual mistrust and political misjudgements ultimately led to a war whose scale had been vastly underestimated by all those involved. This is the fatal crux of Sachs’s real warning: “Major wars do not necessarily require a major, rational cause. They can arise from a chain of misjudgements.”
The notion that China must be ‘contained’ or defeated is therefore particularly problematic. Sachs does not dispute China’s growing power. Rather, he disputes the conclusion that this must inevitably lead to a US-China power struggle.
For, according to Sachs, China does not seek to replace the United States as the global hegemon. Rather, Beijing’s primary aim is to prevent itself from being dominated once again by foreign powers which, according to statements repeated ad nauseam, seek to halt China’s economic and technological rise.
Ukraine, Iran and the ‘escape from reality’
Sachs links this analysis to Western assessments of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. In particular, he criticises the fact that, in his view, political communication has repeatedly created an image that is at odds with the actual balance of power. Sachs interprets the mantra-like repetition of claims that Ukraine is bound to win, that China is on the brink of collapse, or that Iran is easy to defeat militarily and socially, as an expression of the West’s ‘escape from reality’.
In his view, a psychological mechanism lies behind this: when someone refuses to accept their own weakness, they must emphasise their own strength all the more. This ‘grandiosity’ regarding one’s own strength can, in turn, give rise to paranoia – the notion that all other powers are working against the West.
Sachs cites Iran in particular as an example. The country is frequently portrayed in the West as a backward state. In reality, however, Iran has a highly educated population, a developed infrastructure and a long tradition of civilisation. Here, too, Sachs sees a dangerous discrepancy between Western perception and reality.
The dollar as an instrument of power is losing its effectiveness
Washington has increasingly used the dollar and the international financial system as a means of exerting pressure in foreign policy. Countries such as Russia, Iran and Venezuela have consequently been affected by the Western-dominated financial system. Yet it is precisely this instrument that could, and will, turn against the US in the long term. For the more frequently the dollar is used as a weapon, the greater the incentive for other states to establish alternative payment systems. And in this regard, China and Russia, together with BRICS+, have made significant progress.
According to Sachs, the ever-expanding Western financial bubble is also one of the causes of the current developments.
In his view, the Western financial world also benefits from the fact that, in parts of the non-Western world – particularly the bourgeois world – the notion has taken root that American technological and economic dominance must be maintained in order to preserve global stability and safeguard one’s own assets and savings. The high valuations of major US technology conglomerates are a further element of this widespread narrative. At the same time, however, the US is deeply in debt, which makes it impossible to carry on as before. Furthermore, the US stock market is at historically high valuation levels, and the AI sector, which has yet to turn a profit, is saddled with historically high debt of around 3 trillion dollars (3,000 billion dollars).
For Sachs, this creates a dangerous vicious circle: a geopolitical bubble props up the financial bubble – and vice versa. The more deeply political and economic actors are invested in this system, the more difficult it becomes to adjust their own strategy. Sachs calls this the ‘sunk-cost’ fallacy: The ruling elites have already invested so much of their careers, reputations and money in a failed strategy that they can only extricate themselves at great cost. So they carry on according to the motto: eyes shut and plough on!
Against this backdrop, Sachs said: ‘Nobody can stop it.’ However, Sachs’s own position is not quite as absolute as the interview’s headline suggests. He explicitly states that a geopolitical explosion or a major financial crash is not inevitable. Both dangers could be avoided through rational policy. Even the First World War could have been avoided. But if one looks at the Great Depression and the financial crisis of 2008, these too were exacerbated by poor political decisions made by the political caste that still holds power today.
Sachs’s pessimistic statement relates rather to political dynamics: if governments cling to an outdated notion of hegemony, even though the balance of power has shifted, the likelihood increases that they will take decisions which ultimately spiral out of control.
According to this logic, the ‘worst-case scenario’ would not simply be a recession. It would be a combination of financial crisis and geopolitical escalation, possibly even leading to a war between the major powers. And this is precisely the point of his comparison with 1914: nobody needs to want a world war for one to break out. The West must accept that its former monopoly is over. A multipolar world is not automatically a disaster. Rather, it is the attempt to restore a defunct world order by increasingly harsh means that could prove catastrophic.
Ultimately, however, Sachs nevertheless expresses a cautious hope. In his view, the people of the US and Europe are by no means obsessed with war. They want to lead normal lives, enjoy economic security and see an end to wars.
The crucial question for him, therefore, is whether democratic institutions can actually translate this will into policy. In this regard, however, the author of these lines takes a pessimistic view of Germany’s prospects.
The current war-mongering federal government is made up of the coalition parties CDU/CSU and SPD. They now enjoy the support of barely a third of the electorate. Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU and SPD are planning to politically paralyse and marginalise the AfD – by far the strongest and only anti-war party in the Bundestag – using anti-democratic and legally highly questionable means.
Preparations to this effect are being made in the event that ‘Alternative for Germany’ wins an absolute majority in the state parliaments in the east and is able to form governments there. In doing so, the ruling CDU/CSU/SPD political caste is so brazenly arrogant that it is even publicly announcing its undemocratic plans against the democratic will of AfD voters, and attempting to sell this off as a measure against the ‘far right’ and for the alleged protection of ‘our’ – but in reality their own – version of ‘democracy’.
Fascism cloaked in anti-fascism
The latter brings to mind Signor Ignazio Silone, the co-founder of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). When he returned to his homeland from exile in Switzerland following Italy’s liberation from the fascists in late 1944, he was asked by the journalist François Bondy at the border crossing whether he believed that fascism would ever return. To this, Silone gave the – from today’s perspective – prophetic reply: “If fascism returns, it will not say: “I am fascism.” No, it will say: “I am anti-fascism.””
About Jeffrey Sachs
Jeffrey D. Sachs, born in 1954, is an American economist and professor at Columbia University in New York. He first gained international recognition for his work on economic development, poverty alleviation and macroeconomic stabilisation. In the 1980s and 1990s, he advised governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe, amongst others, on economic reforms.
Sachs later became a prominent advocate of global development programmes and held various positions at the United Nations. Amongst other roles, he headed the Earth Institute at Columbia University and served as an adviser to UN Secretaries-General. His research and public engagement focus heavily on global development, poverty, sustainability and international politics.
In recent years, Sachs has increasingly emerged as a sharp critic of American foreign policy. Particularly on the issues of Ukraine, NATO, Russia, China and the Middle East, he holds views that diverge significantly from the mainstream foreign policy stance in Washington and many European capitals.
His central argument is that Sachs does not see the real danger in the rise of a multipolar world, but rather in the attempt to halt this rise through a policy of confrontation.
