Berlin, Germany (Weltexpress). Political chaos, rising public debt, social protests, societal polarisation: France is in deep trouble. A geopolitical analysis by the US author Cameron Macgregor warns of the collapse of the Fifth Republic and of Europe-wide upheaval.
France’s political crisis is a reality
France is going through a period of pronounced political instability. Frequent changes of government under President Macron – who is now supported by just 16 per cent of the population – difficult majority situations in parliament and ongoing budgetary conflicts have long been weighing on the political system.
In his Substack blog Men and the City, the American analyst has long been examining economic crises, social upheavals and the political future of the West.
On 5 October 2026, Cameron Macgregor published the article “France is on Fire and Europe will Follow?”. In the article, he describes the main drivers of France’s decline and predicts a possible collapse of the French state with far-reaching consequences for the whole of Europe.
Regardless of the objectively observable deterioration in France’s fiscal situation, one need not share the author’s often extreme analyses – written from a national-conservative and ethno-nationalist perspective – to still find this article instructive. For it provides important pieces of the jigsaw that make up the overall picture of events in France.
At the outset, the author points out that, since 2024, France has had four governments, all of which ended in political crisis. He accuses President Emmanuel Macron of clinging to his excessive claims to power, despite his waning political authority, at the expense of France’s stability.
Between the debt crisis and national bankruptcy
Macgregor identifies a second source of crisis in France’s public finances. High levels of debt and persistently growing budget deficits have long posed considerable challenges for French politics. Public debt is currently estimated at 119 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), which is roughly twice the 60 per cent of GDP ceiling originally agreed within the EU. This trend has led to a significant rise in the cost of financing the French budget deficit, with yields on French government bonds now 1.5 percentage points higher than those on German Bunds. And the trend is upwards.
The author, Macgregor, rightly describes a dangerous spiral here, in which rising bond yields increase the interest burden and thus further reduce the French government’s financial leeway. He even claims that France finds itself in a more difficult situation than Greece did during the European debt crisis 15 years ago. This claim may seem implausible to many readers at first glance, but Macgregor could nevertheless be right.
At the start of the financial crisis 15 years ago, Greece’s external debt also stood at 120 per cent of GDP, but because Greece’s GDP was much smaller, the country was ‘rescued’ from national bankruptcy with far less financial aid than would be required today for such an operation in France.
Neither the European Central Bank (ECB) nor the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could afford such an operation on their own, nor even jointly. With French GDP estimated at just under 3 trillion euros for 2026, public debt of around 120 per cent would amount to approximately 3.6 trillion, or 3,600 billion, or 3,600,000,000,000 euros.
If it comes to the point where France can no longer service its debts in the crisis expected to affect the entire Western world, then Macgregor’s prediction that no bank in the world – neither the ECB, nor the IMF, nor the US Federal Reserve – could prevent financial collapse in Paris might prove accurate.
Protests and social tensions
Macgregor describes a growing protest movement as a further symptom of the crisis. Citing the French Ministry of the Interior, he mentions around 170 demonstrations with some 200,000 participants, possibly even 300,000. Firefighters, teachers, civil servants and students protested against poor working conditions, economic hardships and political decisions. The figures are quoted in his article and the sources are linked accordingly.
The author gives a particularly vivid account of the grievances of a French firefighter in the civil service, whose colleagues are also taking part in the demonstrations in large numbers. He complains about outdated protective equipment, health risks and a lack of social recognition. Macgregor interprets this dissatisfaction as a sign that the French state is increasingly losing its social legitimacy, even amongst civil servants.
The historical precedent: the end of the Fourth Republic
In this chapter, Macgregor draws a parallel with French history. Between 1946 and 1958, the Fourth French Republic suffered from chronic governmental instability. The return of General Charles de Gaulle and the constitutional reform of 1958 ultimately established the Fifth Republic with a significantly strengthened presidency. These historical events are well documented.
Macgregor now argues that France today is once again facing a comparable systemic change. Unlike back then, however, there is no figure of de Gaulle’s stature who could create a new political order. The historical comparison is open to debate. It does not, however, prove that the current crisis will have the same outcome.
Macgregor’s most controversial thesis: migration and national sovereignty
Macgregor sees the very heart of the crisis not in public finances, but in a conflict over national sovereignty. He takes the view that ethnically defined population groups are the true bearers of political sovereignty. In his opinion, democracy alone can no longer provide an answer to this question.
His argument is based on an ethno-nationalist interpretation of social developments. In this context, Macgregor refers to increasing acts of violence by migrants or French people of migrant background, who have turned attacks on police officers in French suburbs into a national pastime. He also reports on unprovoked, often life-threatening acts of violence against white women in the street, such as the attack in Marseille involving a flamethrower.
He also describes the role of militant ‘Black Blocs’, which allegedly use acts of violence to stoke the conflict between migrants and locals.
From this, the author deduces that an ethnic confrontation is imminent. Of particular significance is his reference to the so-called ‘Great Replacement’ theory, according to which the European population is to be displaced from power by immigration. However, it is by no means possible to infer from uncoordinated, isolated acts of violence that migrants as a whole are waging an organised struggle for political dominance, or that they are even capable of doing so. Macgregor’s prediction of a possible civil war between ethnic groups therefore remains highly speculative.
Why Macgregor does not believe in the 2027 election
France is preparing for the next presidential election in 2027. Macgregor names Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Édouard Philippe as possible political contenders. Regardless of the election outcome, he considers stabilisation through democratic elections to be out of the question. His reasoning: the economic, social and institutional conflicts are already too deep-rooted to be resolved within the existing system.
Is Europe facing a new financial crisis?
Macgregor’s most dramatic prediction concerns the international consequences of a possible collapse in France.
He expects that a severe debt crisis could trigger a chain reaction on the financial markets. France’s economic interdependence with the eurozone would affect the other European states.
The underlying mechanism is, in principle, plausible: a severe financial crisis in a major European economy could have significant cross-border consequences. However, this does not answer the question of whether France is actually facing such a crisis.
Marine Le Pen intends to pursue a strict austerity programme in view of the state’s financial situation. If she wishes to avoid a continuation of nationwide protests and unrest during her presidency, she cannot make further cuts to social welfare spending. However, a great deal of money could be saved by halting aid to Ukraine and making further cuts to the military, for example in operations in Africa. The same could be achieved by resuming imports of cheap Russian gas and oil and other energy derivatives, with Paris defying the dictates of Brussels.
Conclusion
Cameron Macgregor paints an accurate picture of a country whose political institutions, public finances and social cohesion are all coming under pressure simultaneously. His article draws attention to real problem areas. At the same time, he links these to far-reaching, partly ideologically driven conclusions.
His central thesis is that France is on the brink of a revolutionary upheaval and will drag Europe into the crisis. This is possible, and given the nervousness on the international government bond markets, the danger is very real. However, this scenario is not inevitable, as Macgregor assumes. For if Le Pen were to win the election, the future president would certainly have the opportunity to halt the deterioration of public finances without further cutting social benefits, and to revive the economy by opening up to the Russian market. That, too, would have far-reaching consequences for the whole of Europe, albeit in a different way to that predicted by Macgregor.
