Berlin, Germany (Weltexpress). Amidst self-inflicted trade wars and hot wars, Trump needs the People’s Republic of China more than the People’s Republic of China needs the US. President Xi travelled to Washington for the three-day summit with a stronger hand than ever before. However, a genuine fresh start between China, the stabilising world power, and the destabilising US regime is unlikely.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump meet in Washington, the stakes are far higher than just tariffs and trade balances. Both sides want to give substance to the ‘constructive strategic stability’ formulated in May. Yet the balance of power has shifted in Beijing’s favour. Xi arrives on the back of a diplomatic offensive, whilst Trump is trying to save his own skin in the conflicts with Iran and in Ukraine. Trump is likely to be speculating that China could be needed, at least indirectly, to resolve both conflicts without the US President losing face.
Xi has carefully reinforced this impression in the weeks leading up to the meeting. Following the summit of the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)” in Bishkek, he visited Egypt and subsequently attended the BRICS summit in New Delhi – his first visit to India in seven years. The joint BRICS declaration opposed tariffs, sanctions and a “America First” policy, without explicitly naming the United States. At the same time, Xi pressed for closer cooperation on future technologies such as artificial intelligence.
Diplomatic reach as an instrument of power
Xi’s trip to Egypt, a key power in the Middle East, underscores China’s growing influence in the region. Washington cannot ignore this influence when shaping its relations with Beijing, whilst it is itself embroiled in the conflict with Iran.
In Cairo, Xi advocated a new security model that would be driven by the states of the region themselves, without direct external influence. In doing so, Xi distanced the Middle East from Washington without holding out China as a new military patron. Similarly, he presented the SCO as a model of peaceful coexistence that is “without alliance, without confrontation and not directed against any third party”. The member states condemned attacks on Iran as violations of international law and supported Tehran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme.
According to China experts at the Brookings Institution, Xi’s trips demonstrate that China has numerous political options at its disposal and wishes to present itself as “increasingly central to a more multipolar international order”. The message is clear: Beijing can negotiate with Washington “without making the US the focal point of its foreign policy”.
Trump seeks respite from two wars
At the same time, the pressure on Trump to act is mounting. Ahead of the mid-term elections in November, his administration is escalating the situation in Ukraine and with regard to Iran, ostensibly in order to ‘de-escalate’. Following a telephone call with Vladimir Putin, Trump stated once again that the Russian president wanted an agreement to end the war in Ukraine. That is likely to be just as credible as Trump’s constant claims that the Iranian leadership is begging him for a ceasefire.
The hope in Washington is that China could help with both crises, or at least facilitate solutions. Sun Yunii, head of the China programme at the Washington-based think tank ‘Stimson Center’,
goes so far in her wishful thinking as to view the possibility of Chinese assistance in resolving the two US conflicts as the ‘bargaining chip’ with which President Xi intends to steer US-China talks at the upcoming summit towards ‘constructive strategic stability’ – a goal at least verbally pursued.
She argues that Beijing’s influence over Russia is considerable and its relationship with Iran close. However, China is unlikely to play these cards for free. In contrast, the more realistically minded, senior China expert Ali Wyneiii of the ‘International Crisis Group’, who acts in an advisory capacity for both the US Congress and the US administration, warned that Moscow will not weaken its strategic relationship with Beijing for the sake of a fragile truce with Washington. Mr Wyne is certainly right about this, as the Kremlin has long-standing experience of what promises and treaties with the US are worth in ‘modern times’. After all, it would not be the first time that a subsequent US administration has swung back towards a tougher line on Russia.
Trade and technology remain at the heart of US-China disputes.
Alongside global crises, the real American power struggle is on the agenda, one which Washington is imposing on the Chinese with great aggression. Washington began with punitive tariffs, export controls and the disruption of supply chains – all in order to maintain the US’s supposedly still overwhelming technological lead. China responded with the same measures, though the US soon realised that it is almost entirely dependent on Chinese supplies in a number of key areas, including high-tech military equipment.
Shortly before the summit, representatives from both countries discussed the risks posed by artificial intelligence. Such talks could establish guidelines, but they do nothing to alter the fact that, from the perspective of the US and the West, semiconductors, digital computing power and standards have long since become strategic instruments that they wish to withhold from Beijing. They see modern, highly developed China as their worst adversary, for its very existence ‘threatens’ their previous global supremacy.
Nevertheless, for Trump, prolonging the precarious status quo in trade relations with China would be politically presentable at home; Xi, for his part, wants to ease US restrictions on Chinese companies and gain planning certainty. This mixture of practical pressure to reach an agreement and fundamental rivalry explains why minor agreements at the summit are more likely than a major political deal.
More of a tactical thaw than a historic fresh start
Xi’s diplomatic strength should nevertheless not be confused with the formation of a unified anti-American bloc. The aforementioned expert, Wyne of the ‘International Crisis Group’, speaks of a Chinese ‘portfolio of transactional partnerships’, not of a coherent anti-Western counter-alliance. Trump’s foreign policy, however, makes it easier for Beijing to present itself as a predictable and stabilising force, particularly when Washington even upsets traditional allies.
Other experts’ expectations of the summit also remain limited. No one is anticipating a fundamental fresh start. A more realistic prospect is an extension of the trade détente and the continuation of direct talks at presidential level. This personal diplomacy now serves as the most important buffer against a further deterioration in relations.
In US domestic politics, the cross-party consensus in favour of a hard line against China remains intact. Individual agreements on the sidelines cannot eliminate US rivalry, US technology controls, US provocations regarding Taiwan, sanctions and military threats against China. Therefore, there is still a long and winding road ahead before the desired ‘strategic stability’ between the two countries is achieved.
Under these circumstances, even modest economic and trade agreements, a measured approach to differences and the avoidance of a new round of escalation would constitute a success. Although Xi is travelling to Washington with greater self-confidence, it must not be overlooked that Trump, for all his unpredictability and despite the US’s strained public finances, still wields enormous economic and military power. However, the preparations for the summit have already demonstrated that the United States is not in a position to both aggressively attempt to contain China and, at the same time, expect China’s support in situations where the US faces a crisis.
